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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS 
INTEGRATED CARE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20060255 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Article 8, §3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(b) (Supp. 
2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED and STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether the district court correctly granted in part Salt Lake County's ("the 
County") motion for partial summary judgment and denied Emergency Physicians 
Integrated Care's ("EPIC") motion for partial summary judgment when it found that 
EPIC's claim of quantum meruit failed because no significant benefit was conferred 
upon the County by EPIC. "When reviewing a district court's denial of summary 
judgment, we grant no deference to the district court's legal conclusions and review 
1 
them for correctness." Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy. Inc.. 2003 UT 43 ^ 
14, 79 P.3d 922. A quantum meruit claim "is a mixed question of law and fact." 
Desert Miriah. Inc. v. B & L Auto. Inc., 2000 UT 83 T|9. 12 P.3d 580. While the 
district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness, [this Court] grant[s] 
it broad discretion in its application of unjust enrichment law to the stipulated facts." 
I d at U 12. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative in this matter and are set forth 
verbatim in Epic Briefs Addenda, Addendum A and in County's Addendum A. 
• Utah Code Ann. § 17-50-319 (Supp. 2001) 
• Utah Code Ann. § 17-15-17 (Supp. 1999) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case: 
Prior to April 30,2001, Salt Lake County paid the billed medical charges 
for all Salt Lake County Jail inmates, except Federal inmates, who received outside 
medical treatment1 as an expense "necessarily incurred in the support of persons 
charged with or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail" 
Utah Code Ann. §17-15-17(3) (Supp. 1999). Following the passage of S.B. 152 
Medical Expenses of County Inmates in 2001, the County began paying all billed 
1
 Additionally, it was County policy to deny medical claims to the extent that 
the treated injuries were self-inflicted or due to a pre-existing condition. 
2 
medical expenses of booked inmates2, including self-inflicted injuries and pre-
existing conditions, at the "noncapitated state Medicaid rates." Utah Code Ann. §17-
50-319 (2)(b). 
EPIC filed its first Notice of Claim on November 20,2001, its second Notice 
of Claim on January 17, 2003 and filed its original complaint on January 19, 2003. 
EPIC's amended complaint included the patients from its first and second notice of 
claims3 plus an additional eighty-two new claims. The sole cause of action in EPIC's 
amended complaint was a claim for quantum meruit. 
b. Course of Proceedings: 
Following its amended complaint, EPIC filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment arguing its quantum meruit theory. The County opposed EPIC's motion 
and filed its own motion for partial summary judgment arguing that UCA §17-50-
319(1 )(k) and (2) controlled the payment of medical expenses for jail inmates. At 
the motion hearing, the trial court requested supplemental briefs regarding the 
County's obligations under the United States Supreme Court case, City of Revere 
v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, (1983). In its supplemental 
briefing, EPIC argued that additional provisions of UCA §17-50-319 applied, creating 
a statutory obligation that could be relied upon to establish the County was conferred 
2Claims for federal inmates are still denied by the County as such claims 
are covered by the federal government. 
3Eight original patients were omitted from the amended complaint, six from 
the first notice and two from the second notice. 
3 
a benefit.4 
c. Disposition at Trial Court: 
The court denied EPIC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
granted the County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to the extent that Plaintiff 
had not shown its entitlement to recover under a claim of quantum meruit. 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated February 8, 2006. The district court also 
noted in its order that the general provisions of UCA §17-50-319, cited by EPIC, 
were inapplicable. As EPIC's only claim was for quantum meruit, the case was 
dismissed with prejudice by the court's order of March 2, 2006. 
EXCEPTION TO EPIC'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS 
The County stipulates to the statement of facts set forth by EPIC, Brief of 
Appellant EPIC ["EPIC Brief] at 4-8, except as to the following: 
1. County's Exception to EPIC's Statement of Facts: 
EPIC submitted the following facts: 
1. 4. When medical situations arise at the jail, nurses 
contracted by the County to provide services, and who 
work at the jail, screen the inmates. A nurse determines 
whether the medical care required is either beyond the 
capacity of the medical personnel at the jail to handle or 
whether emergency medical services from outside the jail 
are necessary. 
4Although EPIC argued the statutory language required payment, EPIC did 
not again amend its complaint. Thus, the only cause of action in EPIC's 
amended complaint is for quantum meruit. 
4 
EPIC Brief at 5. The County disputes in part the accuracy of this fact. The 
County employs 48 registered licensed RNs and 2 LPNs so that there is always an 
available nurse at the jail. (R. 103: Deposition of Troy Dial ["Dial Depo"] 22:18-20; 
23:17-21) Further, the County contracts with a company called Wellcon to provide 
physician services at the jail and to be on call, 24-7, to consult with the nursing staff. 
(R. 102: Dial Depo 19: 1-17; R. 106: Dial Depo 36:8-9). 
2. 9. EPIC has requested payment for its emergency medical 
services provided to Salt Lake County jail inmates from the 
County but, as to some inmates, the County has denied 
that it has any legal duty to pay for the medical services 
provided by EPIC. 
EPIC Brief at 6. The County disputes in part the accuracy of this fact. While the 
County admitted that EPIC physicians treated all the patients listed in its notice of 
claims and attached to their amended complaint, the County denied that it was billed 
for all patients listed. (R. 75) Further, as to certain patients listed by EPIC, the 
County denied owing monies as payment had been made, the patient was not a 
County inmate at the time of service, or the County had no legal duty to pay. (R. 75) 
2. County's Additional Relevant Facts 
The County submits the following additional relevant facts: 
1. For eligible claims arising after April 30, 2001, the County paid EPIC at 
the "noncapitated" state Medicaid rate. (R. 109, 240). 
2. The medical services provided at the jail are akin to the care provided 
by an Instacare clinic. Medical needs beyond that level are sent to a hospital. (R. 
5 
106:DialDepo34: 17-19). 
3. When an emergency arises and an ambulance is called, it is the 
paramedics who determine where the inmate is taken based on the inmate's medical 
condition. (R. 104: Dial Depo. 27:9-11). 
4. EPIC sought recovery for its physicians for the difference between their 
billed charges and the statutory rate paid by the County under a theory of quantum 
meruit. (R. 240). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
EPIC's original complaint alleged a violation of Utah Code Ann §17-50-319 
and a claim for unjust enrichment. Thereafter, EPIC amended its complaint to state 
only a claim in quantum meruit.5 Epic argues that its physicians provide the County 
with a substantial benefit by enabling the County to discharge its constitutional duty 
and thus save the costs associated with lawsuits and the hiring of its own physicians. 
In reality, the medical expertise and care, for which EPIC seeks enhanced 
compensation, is given directly to the emergency room patient. It is the patient who 
retains the true benefit of the doctor's services. While equity may demand that the 
patient compensate the physician, as between the physician and the County it is not 
unjust for the County to retain the incidental benefit of the patient receiving medical 
5EPIC briefly mentions that this case also falls under an implied-in-fact 
contract theory. EPIC Brief at 17. However, as they have failed to address this 
issue before the trial court or in their brief, it should be considered waived. 
Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379,1J20, 80 P.3d 546. 
6 
care. 
When analyzing EPIC's request for partial summary judgment, the district 
court set out to determine if EPIC could meet the necessary elements under 
quantum meruit. The district court, relying upon Myrtle Beach Hospital, Inc. v. City 
of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d 868 (SC 2000), determined that EPIC physicians did 
not confer a direct benefit on the County. The district court turned to Myrtle Beach 
because it is the only cost allocation case directly on point. 
The cases relied upon by EPIC do not establish that a benefit was 
conferred upon the County. The district court reviewed the cited cases and referred 
to Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319, which enumerates county charges and directly 
addresses the payment of medical care costs for jail inmates at healthcare facilities 
but is silent as to physicians. Nevertheless, given that EPIC's sole claim is under 
quantum meruit, the district court did not address the applicability of the medical cost 
allocation provision of UCA §17-50-319 but simply determined that the general 
provisions of section 17-50-319 (a), (b), ( c), (f) and (i) did not require payment by 
the County to EPIC. 
Finally, EPIC argues that the general provisions of UCA §17-50-319 
bolster its quantum meruit claim. However, EPIC's arguments, which rely upon 
general provisions relating to the sheriff's office, fail to establish that EPIC conferred 
a benefit upon the County. EPIC's efforts at extrapolating from the general 
provisions of the statute while ignoring the more specific provisions at issue, defy 
7 
basic principals of statutory construction. Therefore, the district court was correct 
in granting the County's summary judgment motion, in part, as a matter of law. This 
court should affirm the district court's order. 
ARGUMENT 
1. EPIC Fails to Establish a Quantum Meruit Claim. 
The district court correctly ruled that EPIC failed to establish a right to 
recovery under its sole claim of quantum meruit. In order to succeed, EPIC was 
required to show: 
(1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and 
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit 
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value. 
Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984). Moreover, this court "afford[s] 
the district court broad discretion in its application of the law of unjust enrichment to 
the facts of the particular case." Desert Miriah, Inc. v.B&L Auto, Inc. 2000 UT 83, 
1J17, 12P.3d580, 583. 
EPIC argues on appeal as it did below, that the following "benefits" satisfy 
the first element of quantum meruit: 1) the County discharges its constitutional duty 
and thereby minimizes any damage awards from civil rights lawsuits and 2) an 
efficient use of tax payer money along with the cost savings of "not retaining [a] full-
time . . . staff of physicians" or the "overhead costs [of] maintaining a health care 
facility." EPIC Brief at 17-18. EPIC is unable to argue that a direct benefit is 
8 
conferred upon the County. 
A benefit may be "beneficial services conferred; satisfaction of a debt or 
duty owed . . .; or anything which adds to [ones] security or advantage." Baugh v. 
Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947). However, as a general rule 
one must first exhaust available legal remedies before recovering on the basis of the 
equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097,1099 (UT App 
1988). EPIC made no attempt to establish its efforts of recovery from the patient 
receiving the direct benefits. Instead, EPIC relies upon the County's supposed 
obligation to obtain medical care for inmates as the basis for its recovery under 
quantum meruit. 
When it considered the circumstances of the case and applied them to 
unjust enrichment law, the district court properly determined that EPIC's alleged 
"benefits" did not meet the first element in the quantum meruit analysis. 
A. The Alleged Benefit of Discharging the County's Constitutional 
Duty to Inmates is Merely Incidental. 
EPIC argues that the County has an equitable duty to pay the difference 
between EPIC's billed charges and the noncapitated Medicaid rate already paid by 
the County. EPIC's argument is premised upon the County's obligation to obtain 
medical services for inmates6. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 
Notwithstanding any statements to the contrary, the County's retains its 
defense that certain patient claims were properly denied as the patient was not 
"in custody" at the time of service. (R. 9). 
9 
102 S.Ct. 2979 (1983) established a governmental entity's constitutional obligation 
to obtain necessary medical treatment for pretrial detainees. Revere involved the 
payment for medical treatment provided to a man who was shot while attempting to 
flee the scene of a crime. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that 
inherent in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment was a constitutional duty to pay for the medical services rendered. 
Massachusetts General Hospital v. City of Revere, 385 Mass. 772,774,434 N.E.2d 
185,196 (1982). The United States Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court first held that the Eighth Amendment applied only after 
conviction and therefore had no application to pretrial detainees. Instead, the proper 
constitutional provision was the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which required "the responsible government or governmental agency to provide 
medical care to persons... who have been injured while being apprehended by the 
police." 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 2983 (1983)7. 
As to the allocation of costs, the Court held that it was a matter of state 
law. "As long as the medical care needed is in fact provided, the Constitution does 
not dictate how the cost of that care should be allocated as between the entity and 
7The Court did not articulate the appropriate standard to determine if a 
government agency has violated its Due Process obligations to those detainees 
in its care because under the facts of the case, a Due Process violation was not 
at issue as the needed medical care had been provided. However, it did 
establish a floor, concluding that "the due process rights of a [pretrial detainee] 
are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a 
convicted prisoner." Id. (emphasis added). 
10 
the provider of care." Id. at 245. 
Proper medical treatment is the real "beneficial service[] conferred" by the 
emergency room physicians. Baugh v. Darley, 184 P.2d at 337. Analyzing this 
"benefit," it is the patient who receives and retains the value of the physician's 
expertise, not the County. While equity may require the patient to provide 
restitution8, the incidental benefit conferred on the County of having a place to take 
an inmate is insufficient to meet the first element of the unjust enrichment branch of 
quantum meruit. 
Contrary to EPIC's assertions, the district court found Myrtle Beach 
Hospital, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d 868 (SC 2000), persuasive 
because it is the only case to analyze the issue of allocation of costs under a 
quantum meruit test and directly addresses the "benefit" of discharging a 
governmental entity's constitutional duty9. In Myrtle Beach, the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina reached the hospital's quantum meruit claim only after determining 
that its statutory claim failed. The court reasoned that the state legislature, by 
requiring county and state jailers to pay for medical care, necessarily excluded cities 
from that obligation by omitting them from the statutes. Id. at 871. 
8Even the legislature recognized this fact, when requiring billing to any 
private insurance held by a county inmate before the expense becomes a proper 
county charge. UCA §17-50-319(2)(a). 
9The cases relied upon by EPIC begin and end their analysis with an 
interpretation of their state statutes or for Lutheran Medical Center v. City of 
Omaha, 429 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. 1988) the common law of Nebraska. 
11 
On the hospital's quantum meruit theory, the court held: 
[T]he Hospital cannot prevail on this equitable theory. The first 
two elements are that the City received and retained a benefit. 
Here it is the detainee rather than the City that receives and 
retains the benefits conferred by the Hospital. Further, since the 
only duty on the City is that imposed by the Due Process Clause 
of the federal constitution, and since that duty is fulfilled, 'by 
seeing that [the detainees are] taken promptly to a hospital that 
provides the treatment necessary for his injury,' [] we do not 
perceive any inequity in not requiring the City to reimburse the 
Hospital. To be sure, the City receives an incidental benefit in 
the sense that the existence of the Hospital facilitates the City's 
constitutional duty to ensure the detainee receives necessary 
medical care. 
Myrtle Beach± 532 S.E.2d at 873 (internal citations and notes omitted)(emphasis 
added). This court should affirm the district court's ruling that the "benefit" of taking 
prisoners to the emergency rooms where EPIC's physicians work, is only an 
incidental benefit and thus fails to satisfy the first element of a quantum meruit test. 
Interestingly, EPIC's first benefit argument also ignores the legal reality, as 
EPIC itself has expressed and the district court emphasized, that emergency room 
physicians are under a federal statutory duty to render necessary medical care to all 
emergency room patients. Moreover, physicians who fail to comply face possible 
personal liability10. It is well established that "the mere fact that a person benefits 
10
"When individuals in need of emergency medical care present themselves 
to health care facilities, the facilities, and the individual physicians working at the 
facilities, have an obligation under Federal law to provide emergency medical 
treatment.. . . Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 
42 U.S.C. §1395dd. (R. 84); "[U]nder 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(d), hospitals and 
physicians may be subject to civil penalties and liability for failure to comply...." 
12 
another is not by itself sufficient to require the other to make restitution. The value 
of services performed by a person for his own advantage and from which another 
benefits incidentally are not recoverable" Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 
(Utah 1984). Applying this reasoning to the facts in this case, it is to the physician's 
own benefit to treat patients regardless of payment, because doing so satisfies a 
federal statutory duty. 
Furthermore, while it is true that the United State Supreme Court noted that 
" i f . . . the governmental entity can obtain the medical care needed . . . only by 
paying for it, then it must pay. City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 
463 U.S. 239, 245 (1983). The Supreme Court went on to acknowledge that a 
physician's statutory obligation may prove to be a possible alternative to an entity 
paying for medical care, stating "[t]here are, however, other means by which an 
entity could meets its [constitutional] obligation. Many hospitals are subject to 
federal or state laws that require them to provide care to indigents", Revere 463 
U.S. at 244-246. (emphasis added). 
Therefore, given EPIC's own obligations under federal law and the 
unequivocal fact that "it is the detainee rather than the [County] that receives and 
retains the benefits conferred by [EPIC]", any benefit to the County provided by 
being allowed to occasionally take inmates to emergency rooms staffed by EPIC 
physicians, is merely incidental. Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d at 873. 
(R. 149). 
13 
B. The Cost Saving of Hiring Physician Is Incidental 
By asserting that its quantum meruit benefit should be measured by the 
value of not only the physicians' services but also by the value of the physical 
facilities (i.e., hospital or clinic) in which those services are rendered,11 EPIC's 
second benefit argument is both confusing and inconsistent with its claim that 
"physicians" are separate and apart from "facilities" within the meaning of the Utah 
Statute Sec. 17-50-319. It appears that EPIC is trying to "have its cake and eat it 
too." It insists on one hand that its physicians are not subject to the Medicaid-
governed rate structure imposed by Sec. 17-50-319, as the "[h]ealthcare 
professionals such as emergency room doctors opted out." Epic Brief at 27. Yet, 
on the other hand, it would recover both for the value of the physicians' services and 
for the costs arising from the maintenance of a health care facility (from which it 
seeks to distance itself). Epic Brief at 27. EPIC cannot have it both ways. 
More importantly, EPIC's argument again ignores the reality that the 
primary beneficiary of the physician's service is the patient, not the County. Any cost 
savings to the County in not having a full-time emergency room doctor on staff are 
merely incidental. This Court should uphold the district court's application of the facts 
11EPIC maintains that the second benefit to the County includes the "money 
the County saves by not retaining the full-time services of a staff of physicians 
capable of dealing with all emergency care that may arise at the jail, along with 
associated savings of overhead costs associated with maintaining a health care 
facility at the jail that is capable of handling a wide variety of medical needs." 
Epic's Brief at 17-18. (emphasis added). 
14 
to unjust enrichment law and deny EPIC's appeal. 
C. There is No injustice in County Retaining the Alleged "Benefit" 
The district court recognized that under the circumstances of this case, 
EPIC could not, as a matter of law, meet the third element of quantum meruit, 
either. First, it is the patient that receives and retains the real benefit of the 
physician's service. Second, EPIC's statutory duty, irrespective of the County, 
allows the same patient to present himself to the emergency room and be 
treated. In this case the alleged "value" is the difference between the Medicaid 
rate paid by the County and EPIC's billed charges. 
Therefore, as between the County and EPIC, circumstances are not such 
that "it [is] inequitable for the conferee to retain the [incidental] benefit without 
payment of its value." Berrett, 690 P.2d at 55712. EPIC fails as a matter of law 
to establish a quantum meruit claim and this Court should uphold the district 
court's application of unjust enrichment law and deny EPIC recovery. 
2. The District Court's Order is in Line with Cases Relied Upon 
by EPIC. 
EPIC's analysis of Myrtle Beach is inaccurate. In fact, Myrtle Beach is in 
line with EPIC's own premise that "once a duty to provide inmates with necessary 
medical treatment is established, whether by statute or constitutional obligation, 
12There is nothing that prevents EPIC from seeking recovery from the 
patients themselves. 
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absent legislative directive to the contrary, cities or counties are obligated to pay 
for those services." EPIC Brief at 20-21. (Emphasis added). In Myrtle Beach, the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina looked to state statutes and found a "legislative 
directive to the contrary." It was this determination that allowed the court to even 
begin a quantum meruit analysis. 
Contrary to EPIC's assertions, the distinction for the South Carolina court was 
not one between pre-trail detainees and post conviction inmates but between "city" 
inmates and "county or state" inmates. The South Carolina court noted that the 
statutes relied upon by the hospital specifically referenced either the duties of the 
state or the duties of counties. It was the hospital's contention that the court should 
infer from those statutes that cities are under similar obligations. However, the court 
in Myrtle Beach applied the well-established rule of statutory construction expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius and held in part that the legislature's failure to specifically 
include cities along with the county and state as responsible entities for expenses 
incurred for inmate health care, meant there was no statutory obligation on the city. 
Id. at 871. 
Myrtle Beach is not alone in finding exclusions to such statutes. In Meriter 
Hospital, Inc., v. Dane County, 268 Wis.2d 658,673 N.W.2d 328 (Wl App 2003), the 
issue was whether Dane County had to pay for all the medical expenses of an 
indigent prisoner even after he was no longer "held under the state criminal laws" by 
the sheriff. The court concluded that under Wisconsin statutes, the county was 
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required to pay the medical expenses only while the inmate was "held" but "was no 
longer liable for medical costs incurred after the trial court dismissed charges." Id. at 
666. 
Likewise, in Craven County Hospital Corp. v. Lenoir County, et al., 75 N.C. 
App. 453, 331 S.E.2d 690 (NC App. 1985), the facts in that case13 removed the 
patient from the state statutes requiring payment. The Court found that the City was 
not liable because the statute dealing with cities required "confinement" and that was 
not the case as the officers never arrested the man but simply transported him. The 
County was not liable because the man was never "in the custody" of the sheriff. 
Further, there were no express promise to pay by the City or the County as was 
alleged in Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 294 (N.C. 1926), relied on by EPIC. 
In fact, the Spicer court held that the general rule in North Carolina was "that, in the 
absence of some express provisions of the law, the public is not liable to a physician 
or surgeon for services rendered prisoners, even though they are insolvent, and 
unable to pay for such services themselves." Craven County, 331 S.E.2d at 693. 
In Mercy Hospital Medical Center v. County of Marion, 590 N.W.2d 41, 44 
(Iowa 1999), the court determined that the patient did not qualify as a "prisoner" under 
the statute because he was not in custody of the sheriff at the time of service. 
Therefore the County was not liable to the hospital. Accord, LaCrosse Lutheran 
13The case involved an inebriated man who was picked up by city police 
officers. The man fell and hit his head when he got out of the police car on his 
way into the county jail. He was taken to the hospital where he later died. 
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Hospital v. LaCrosse County, 133 Wis 2d 335, 395, N.W.2d 612 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1986)(Patient was not from the jail therefore statute didn't apply). 
Most importantly, the cases relied upon by EPIC are clearly distinguishable 
because in answering the question of the proper allocation of medical costs as 
between the provider and the entity, these courts analyze only their state statutes (or 
common law). For example, Poudre Valley Health Care, Inc. v. CityofLoveland, 85 
P.3d 558,560 (Colo. App. 2003) involves a statute, similar to Utah's before the 2001 
amendment, which does not include an express allocation of medical costs14. While 
the issue of allocation of costs under Utah's former statute was not addressed by 
Utah's courts, the County interpreted our statute in much the same way that the 
Poudre Valley court interpreted Colorado's statute and paid for the medical expenses 
billed. 
Similarly, in Hospital Bd. of Directors of Lee County v. Durkis, 426 S.2d 50, 
51 (Fla. App. 1982), the court found that Florida's general statute, which required the 
14Colo. Rev. Statutes. §16-3-401(2): "Persons arrested or in custody shall 
be treated humanely and shall be provided with adequate food, shelter, and, if 
required, medical treatment. Anyone receiving medical treatment while held in 
custody may be assessed a medical treatment charge as provided by in section 
17-26-104.5, C.R.S." 
Cf., Utah Code Ann. §17-22-8 (1)(Supp 2005) provides: "[T]he sheriff shall: . . 
provide them necessary food, clothing, and bedding in the manner prescribed by 
the county legislative body." Along with, UCA §17-15-17 (3) (Supp 1999): "[T]he 
expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or 
convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail." 
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establishment of "rules and regulations with reference to furnishing medical attention 
to county prisoners," included an inherent duty to pay.15 
Poudre Valley and Durkis are in accord with several other state court cases, 
including The United Hospital v. D'Annunzio, 514 N.W.2d 681, 684-686 (N.D. 1994) 
and Smith v. Linn County, 342 N.W.ed 861,863 (Iowa 1984) which were also cited by 
EPIC. These state courts analyzed similarly worded statutes16 to determine who 
should pay for inmate care. The majority of courts have implied a duty to pay when 
given a statutory duty to ensure medical care with no specific reference to payment 
of that care.17 
The cases upon which EPIC relies deal with general statutory obligations to 
provide medical care to prisoners, whereas Utah's legislature has specifically 
addressed the issue of the allocation of medical costs of jail inmate, and has excluded 
physicians. 
15Bi/f see, Metropolitan Dade County v. P.L. Dodge Foundations, et al, 509 
S.2d 1170, 1175 (Fla App. 1987)(Proof of indigence a prerequisite for liability of 
governmental entity for medical care costs.) 
16See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. §356.15 (1995)"AII charges and expenses for 
the safekeeping and maintenance of prisoners . . ."; ND St § 12-444.1-14(6) 
(1994) "Ensure that inmates have adequate medical care." 
17ln fact, of the cases relied upon by EPIC, only Washington had a statute 
that specifically required that "[pjayment for emergency or necessary health care 
shall be by the governing unit." Revised Code of Washington § 70.48.130 (1989). 
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3. EPIC's Statutory Argument Does Not Aid Its Quantum Meruit Claim 
EPIC cannot rely on the general provisions of UCA § 17-50-319 to bolster its 
claim for relief under quantum meruit. EPIC's argument is contrary to well established 
rules of statutory construction. It is a cardinal rule that "when two provisions address 
the same subject matter and one provision is general while the other is specific, the 
specific provision controls." Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 882 
P.2d 1143, 1145-1146 (Utah 1994)(Subsection dealing specifically with household 
relatives controlled over general provision on permissive users); State v. Vigil, 842 
P.2d843, 845-846 (Utah 1992)(Analyzing UCA §76-4-101, the court held that "the 
more specific requirement of intent in paragraph (2)... takes precedence over the 
general culpability requirement in paragraph (1)."); Osuala v. Aetna Life & Gas. 608 
P.2d 242, 242-243 (Utah 1980)(applying the rule to UCA §§ 31-41-6 & 7). 
Applying this rule to UCA §17-50-319, it is clear that paragraphs (1 )(k) and (2)18 
specifically deal with the cost of providing medical care to jail inmates and provides, 
in sum, that absent private inmate insurance or a contract, the County will pay the 
18
 (1 )(k) for a county of the first or second class and subject to Subsection 
(2), expenses incurred by a health care facility in providing medical services at 
the request of a county sheriff for existing conditions of:... 
(2)(a) expenses described in Subsection (1)(k) are a county charge only 
to the extent that they exceed any private insurance in effect that covers those 
expenses. 
(b) if there is no contract between a county jail and a health care 
facility that establishes a fee schedule for medical services rendered, expenses 
under Subsection (1)(k) shall be commensurate with the current noncapitated 
state Medicaid rates.... 
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noncapitated state Medicaid rates. In contrast, the paragraphs cited by EPIC, (1)(a), 
(b), (c), (f) and (i)19 are all generalized provisions that deal with expenses incurred by 
the county or by the sheriffs office but do not specifically address medical care costs. 
Therefore, these provisions do not apply because they are superceded by the more 
specific provisions of § 17-50-319(1 )(k) and (2) which detail the subject of rates for 
County inmate medical services. 
By purposefully excluding themselves from the coverage of the amended 
statute, the emergency physicians gambled on procuring a better private contract rate 
for themselves for provision of inmate medical services. However, no contract has yet 
been executed between EPIC and the County. The instant action by EPIC is simply 
an attempt to insulate EPIC from the risk it intentionally assumed by opting out of the 
statutory payment scheme. 
EPIC argues that the County's position reflects an "irrational" interpretation of 
Sec. 17-50-319 because it suggests that "facilities" should be reimbursed for prisoner 
19(1)(a) those incurred against the county by any law; 
(b)the necessary expenses of the county attorney or district attorney 
incurred in criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses 
necessarily incurred by the county or district attorney in the prosecution of 
criminal cases, except jury and witness fees; 
(c) the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged 
with or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail; 
(f) the contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit of 
the county; 
(i) the necessary expenses of the sheriff and deputies incurred in civil and 
criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses necessarily incurred 
by the sheriff and deputies performing the duties imposed upon them by law; 
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medical care (albeit at a reduced Medicaid rate), while physicians would receive 
nothing. EPIC Brief at 26. However, the logical outcome of EPIC's position is equally 
irrational, subjecting "facilities" to limited Medicaid payment schedules while 
physicians would be permitted to charge whatever amount they like. EPIC's 
interpretation, and its desired relief, would improperly give preferential treatment to 
physicians over health care facilities. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Revere, the County has a constitutional duty to make available needed 
medical care for its inmates. Once needed medical care is provided, the County's 
constitutional duty is fulfilled. Any allocation of costs between the provider of the 
health care and the governmental entity is a matter of state law, not federal 
constitutional law. 
EPIC's physicians lobbied and succeeded in excluding themselves from the 
payment provisions of U.C.A. §17-50-319, in a gamble to secure a higher paying 
contract than the legislature granted. Absent such a contract, the County has no 
statutory duty to pay EPIC. 
EPIC's claims under quantum meruit also fail as the County receives only an 
incidental, not a primary benefit, when EPIC treats inmates brought to facilities where 
they work. 
This Court should affirm the district court's determination that EPIC failed to 
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establish its claim of quantum meruit. Accordingly, the district court's order should be 
affirmed. 
Dated this day of July, 2006 
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23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
Salt Lake County was mailed this . day of July, 2006 to the following: 
BrianS. King (4610) 
James L. Harris, Jr (8204) 
336 S. 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1739 
Facsimile (801) 532-1936 
Attorney for Appellant EPIC 
md)u^ Mil 
24 
ADDENDUM A 
25 
WMlaw 
UT ST § 17-15-17 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 17-15-17 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 17. COUNTIES 
CHAPTER 15. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Copyright ® 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a 
division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights 
reserved. 
17-15-17 County expenses enumerated. 
County charges are: 
(1) those incurred against the county by any law; 
(2) the necessary expenses of the county attorney or district attorney 
incurred in criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses 
necessarily incurred by him in the prosecution of criminal cases, except jury and 
witness fees; 
(3) the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with 
or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail; 
(4) the sums required by law to be paid to jurors in civil cases for counties 
not within the state district court administrative system; 
(5) all charges and accounts for services rendered by any justice court judge 
for services in the trial and examination of persons charged with a criminal 
offense not otherwise provided for by law; 
(6) the contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit of 
the county; 
(7) every other sum directed by law to be raised for any county purposes under 
the direction of the governing body of the county or declared a county charge; 
(8) the fees of constables for services rendered in criminal cases; 
(9) the necessary expenses of the sheriff and his deputies incurred in civil 
and criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses necessarily 
incurred by the sheriff and his deputies performing the duties imposed upon them 
by law; and 
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(10) the sums required by law to be paid by the county to jurors and witnesses 
serving at inquests and in criminal cases in justice courts. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 538; C.L. 1917, § 1434; R.S. 1933, 19-11-17; L. 
1941, Ch. 20, § 1; C. 1943, 19-11-17; L. 1977, ch. 212, § 6; 1987, ch. 181, § 1; 
1988, ch. 152, § 2; 1990, ch. 59, § 5; 1993, ch. 38, § 8. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or 
district attorney" in Subsection (2). 
Cross-References. --County audit, notice of, § 17-36-40. 
Courtrooms, cost of furnishings, § 78-7-13. 
Indigent pupils at deaf and blind schools, expenses of, §§ 53A-25-101 et seq., 
53A-25-201 et seq. 
Prisoners, care of generally, § 17-22-8. 
Sanity hearings, costs of, § 77-15-9. 
Settlement and allowances of accounts by county legislative body, § 17-5- 218. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Expenses of county attorney. 
While the district attorney, under Subsection (2) of this section, may incur 
necessary expenses in prosecution of criminal cases and may make them county 
charges, he may not bind the county beyond what is reasonably necessary, or for 
services rendered beyond the reasonable value thereof. Kytka v. Weber County, 48 
Utah 421, 160 P. Ill (1916) . 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. --20 C.J.S. Counties § 172 et seq. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 17-15-17 
UT ST § 17-15-17 
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